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Abstract
In this paper we examine the degree of market integration in French gas imports. Are there substantial
price differences between gas from different export countries, and do prices move together? Furthermore,
we analyze to what extent the French, German and Belgian markets are integrated. The long-term take-
or-pay contracts are described and analyzed. Time series of Norwegian, Dutch and Russian gas export
prices are examined for the period 1990-1997. Cointegration tests show that that the different border
prices for gas to France move proportionally over time, indicating that the Law of One Price holds.
Although one could expect different producer countries to have different supply obligations, we do not
find any significant differences in mean prices. When the study is extended to an inter-country analysis
including Germany and Belgium, we find that national markets are highly integrated.
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21. Introduction
Increased market integration is a central motivation behind the liberalization of the natural gas
market in the European Union. There seems to be some consensus that European gas markets
until now have been poorly integrated. We examine this issue, with the aim of providing some
estimates of the degree of market integration in the gas market during the 1990s.
Economic theory predicts that prices on homogenous products from different suppliers
should follow the same pattern over time in an integrated market. With the exception of short-run
movements, price differentials should only be present if there are differences in transportation
costs or quality. However, the explanation behind price discrepancies may be somewhat more
complicated in the European market for natural gas. Natural gas is overwhelmingly sold on
complex long-term contracts that have a number of features that may influence the contract price,
and hence lead to price variations across contracts. Furthermore, as most of the natural gas is
supplied from few countries, there may be elements of political risk that can influence relative
prices.
In this paper we first focus on the degree of market integration in the French market for
natural gas. Furthermore, we investigate the link between the French, German and Belgian market.
We focus on the French imports from the three largest providers of natural gas – the Netherlands,
Norway and Russia. This is similar to Asche, Osmundsen and Tveterås [1], where the relationship
between natural gas from the three suppliers is investigated in Germany. However, in addition to
investigating whether the French market for natural gas is integrated, we also investigate the link
between the French and the German and Belgian markets. This is of interest, since it will give
information about the extent to which existing pipeline infrastructure and market structure allow
efficient arbitrage between France and Germany/Belgium.
3We investigate the degree of market integration in the French market by examining the
relationship between the import prices from the three main suppliers, the Netherlands, Norway and
Russia. The relationship between the French, German and Belgian markets is investigated using
the prices on imports from the Netherlands. Since the prices appear to be nonstationary,
cointegration analysis will be the empirical tool. We will also examine the underlying determinants
of our empirical results, particularly on the impact of the contract structure. An analysis of the
long term take-or-pay gas export contracts is given, and the export strategies of the Netherlands,
Norway and Russia are examined in relation to our empirical findings. For a more general
presentation of the export strategies of these countries – as well as Algeria - see Mabro and
Wybrew-Bond [2] and Stoppard [3].
With the exception of Asche, Osmundsen and Tveterås [1], little empirical work has been
carried out with respect to the extent of the market for natural gas in Europe. However, the basic
methodological approach has been used in several studies of US gas markets (Doan and Spulber
[4], Walls [5], DeVanry and Walls [6], Serletis and Herbert [7]). We will use some recent
development in methods and theory to increase the informational content of these tests. Since we
use the Johansen test (Johansen, [8], [9]) when testing for cointegration, we can also test
parameter restrictions on the cointegration parameters. In this context it is of particular interest to
test for the Law of One Price. Moreover, Asche, Bremnes and Wessells [10] have shown that
when the Law of One Price holds, the generalized composite commodity theorem of Lewbel [11]
will hold. Hence, the market integration tests can also contain information about whether the
goods in question can be aggregated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a presentation of the French natural
gas market. In Section three the features of gas sales contracts are analyzed. Section four presents
4the market integration theory and test methodology that we utilize in our empirical analysis. The
empirical analysis of import prices is undertaken and explanations for price differences are given in
Section five. Finally, Section six provides concluding remarks.
2. The Natural Gas Market: France, Germany and Belgium
In this section we provide a description of important characteristics of the French natural gas
market. We also touch upon the German and Belgian gas markets, since we will include these later
in the market integration analysis.
Natural gas had a 12.4% share of total energy supply in France in 1997 [12]. This is
somewhat smaller than in many other European countries. For example, in the two other countries
we analyze in this study, Germany and Belgium, natural gas constituted 20.7% and 19.8%,
respectively, of total energy supply. The main source of energy in France is nuclear power with a
market share of 40.7%. However, natural gas is expected to obtain increasing market shares in the
future.
In 1998 France consumed 37.9 billion cubic meter (bcm) of natural gas, making it the 4th
largest market in continental western Europe. Indigenous production was only 2.1 bcm, or 6.3%,
of total gross consumption, while 35.0 bcm was imported. In other words, the import share was
92.4%. For Germany and Belgium the import shares of domestic consumption was 80.2% and
100%, respectively. French gas imports increased during the data period 1990-1998, but less than
in Germany. The import share was above 90% in all years.
The main pipeline suppliers of natural gas to France are the Netherlands, Norway and
Russia. In 1997 Norway was the largest supplier (10.59 bcm), followed by Russia (10.23 bcm)
5and the Netherlands (5.08 bcm) [13]. It should also be noted that Algeria supplied 9.44 bcm LNG
to France in 1997.
The French gas sector is dominated by Gaz de France (GDF), a state-owned company,
which until now has enjoyed monopoly rights over imports and exports, a large part of the
transportation system, and the most of the distribution network. Most of the gas to end users
served by the low pressure grid is supplied by GDF. A large proportion of the 17 non-GDF
distributors are also supplied by GDF through its transportation system [13]. In Belgium, the
company Distrigaz has enjoyed a similar position as GDF, with monopoly rights on imports and
transportation. Distrigaz is also a major transit company for Dutch and Norwegian gas to France,
and since 1998 for Interconnector gas from the UK to France, Germany and the Netherlands. The
situation in the import and transmission segments has been somewhat different in Germany than in
France and Belgium, with seven gas importers in 1996, although with Ruhrgas as the dominant
importer, with 61% of total imports in 1996 [14]. In 1995, 18 transmission/merchant companies
(Ferngasgesellschaften) were operating on the German market [13].
GDF’s import monopoly means that it has negotiated French gas supply contracts with the
Netherlands, Norway and Russia [15]. Hence, the company should have been in an excellent
position to exploit arbitrage opportunities. However, this may not necessarily imply that GFD has
obtained the same prices for gas from these countries. Long-term contracts with foreign suppliers
were signed in different time periods, the suppliers may not have been in the same bargaining
position, and the contracts may also have had different requirements with respect to swing, etc.
63. The gas sales contracts
European import contracts have a number of detailed specifications on the gas to be delivered.
The natural gas is processed from the sellers to satisfy strict requirements with respect to quality.
In regulating contracting volumes, the exporting and the importing companies have conflicting
interests. Since gas storage is expensive and in limited supply, the importer would like to have
flexibility with respect to volumes, thus being able to adjust to changes in downstream demand.
Demand fluctuates, especially over the seasons, with a higher demand in winter than in summer.
The exporters, on the other hand, have to sink large irreversible investments in extraction,
processing, and transportation facilities. Before doing so, they would like to have assurances that
they will be able to sell the gas over a considerable period of time, thus securing a return on their
investments. Also, to exploit the extraction, processing and transportation capacity, the seller
would prefer to deliver a stable gas stream at maximum capacity utilization. The exporter would –
before making large irreversible investments – prefer a specific price, a minimum price, or other
types of price guarantees for the entire period of delivery. The buyers, on the other hand, would
like the gas price to be responsive to the price of substitutes (such as oil products), so that they are
able to sell the gas.
The challenging task for gas contract design is to trade off these conflicting interests with
respect to volume and price. The exact contents of these contracts are secret, but the general
contract structure is common knowledge in the gas industry. The major part of gas export to
France in the period 1990-1998 was sold on long term take-or-pay contracts, see Brautaset et al.
[16]. In these contracts, the buyer agrees to receive a certain volume of gas per year or,
alternatively, to pay for the part of this gas volume that it does not like to receive. At the same
7time, the buyer has an option to take out more gas than these minimum annual amounts, thus
conveying some flexibility. Substantial volume flexibility is also available on a daily basis.
The current price on gas delivered according to the long-term take-or-pay contracts is
determined by a price formula. The formula links the current gas price to the price of relevant
energy substitutes, thus continuously securing the buyer competitive terms. The price formula
consists of two parts, a constant basis price (fixed term) and an escalation supplement linking the
gas price to alternative forms of energy (variable term). This is the structure of most natural gas
contracts in Europe. Examples of alternative energy commodities used in pricing formulas for
natural gas are light fuel oil, coal, and electricity. Usually a combination of alternatives is used for
escalation purposes (weighted average). The basis price (which is not subject to subsequent price
revision) reflects the parties’ evaluation of the value of the gas at the time of entering the contract.
Each of the alternative energy commodities are assigned a certain weight in the escalation element,
reflecting the competitive situation between natural gas and the substitute. The price change of
each energy commodity is multiplied by an energy conversion factor, to make the substitute and
natural gas commensurable. Thereafter, the individual escalation terms are multiplied by impact
factors, i.e., the change in the price of the substitute is not fully reflected in the gas price.
4. Price based test for market integration and aggregation
A number of market definitions are based on the relationship between prices. For instance, Stigler
([17], p. 85) defines a market as “the area within which the price of a good tends to uniformity,
allowances being made for transportation costs”. Other influential economists like Cournot [18]
and Marshall [19] provide similar definitions of a market. A similar definition can be used in
product space, but where transportation costs are replaced by quality differences [20], [21].
8Market definitions like these have lead to an extensive literature testing for market integration
based on the relationship between prices. In international markets, the prices must be compared in
the same currency, and exchange rate movements can therefore also play a part [22]. However, in
primary goods markets the price is often quoted in a single currency (normally USD), and even if
this is not the case, one often assumes perfect exchange rate pass through, and denote the prices in
a common currency. Transportation costs and quality differences can also be modeled explicitly,
but are in most cases assumed to be constant.
The basic relationship to be investigated when analyzing relationships between prices is
then
tt pp 21 lnln βα += (1)
where α is a constant term (the log of a proportionality coefficient) that captures transportation
costs and quality differences and β gives the relationship between the prices. If β=0, there are no
relationship between the prices, while if β=1 the Law of One Price holds, and the relative price is
constant. In this case the goods in question are perfect substitutes. If β is different from zero but
not equal to one there is a relationship between the prices, but the relative price is not constant,
and the goods will be imperfect substitutes. One can also show that if β is negative, this implies
that the goods in question are complements. Equation (1) describes the situation when prices
adjust immediately. However, often there will be a dynamic adjustment pattern, This can be
accounted for by introducing lags of the two prices [23], [24]. It should be noted here that even
when dynamics are introduced, the long-run relationship will have the same form as equation (1).
There is also a close link between market integration and aggregation. If β=1, not only do
the Law of One Price hold, but also the composite commodity theorem of Hicks [25] and Leontief
9[26]. This criterion is the first criterion used for aggregation in economics. It states that if prices of
a group of goods move proportionally over time, these goods can be represented by a single price
and a single quantity. A problem with the composite commodity theorem in empirical work is that
for the theorem to hold, the prices must be exactly identical. However, Lewbel [11] provides an
empirical useful generalization of the theorem that allows for some deviations from
proportionality. There are several ways to test for the generalized commodity theorem. In a
market integration context, a simple test is whether the Law of One Price holds [10].
In most analyses, the proportionality coefficient does not receive much attention. This is
only natural, since it is the relationship between the prices that give us information about the
degree of market integration, and that is relevant for aggregation. However, in our context, also
the proportionality term is of interest, as it holds information about the mean difference between
the prices when the Law of One Price holds. If the proportionality coefficient is equal to one, the
constant term α will be zero, and the two prices are identical except for stationary deviations. If
the proportionality coefficient is larger or less then one, or the constant term α is larger or less
then zero, there will be a price premium in one direction. Hence, in our case, with identical
products delivered at the same location, a test of whether the constant term α is different from
zero is a test for the existence of a risk premium.
Traditionally, relationships like equation (1) or its dynamic counterpart has been estimated
with ordinary least squares (OLS). However, since the late 1980s one has become aware that
when prices are nonstationary, traditional econometric tools cannot be used, since normal
inference theory breaks down [27]. Cointegration analysis is then the appropriate tool.
While stationary data series has constant mean and variance, nonstationary data series are
in general characterized by a nonconstant mean and variance. Heuristically, one can say that a
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nonstationary data series has a structural break at each observation. This structural break is caused
by an innovation, or in a market context, news relevant for the data series. There are several
reasons for why economic price series can be expected to be nonstationary, where Samuelson’s
[28] proof that prices must be nonstationary for a market to be efficient most likely is the most
cited.
The most common tool for testing whether a data series is nonstationary is the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. For each individual data series (xt) the ADF statistic with a trend is
measured from the following regression
tt
k
tot xxTx εασββ γ
γ
γ +∆+++=∆ −
=
− 
1
1 (2)
where ∆ is the difference operator and T is a time trend. If the trend variable is removed from the
regression, the test is referred to as an ADF test with a constant term. The lag length, k, is set to
make the error term white noise [29]. Using the level forms of each series, the null hypothesis is
that each data series is nonstationary. The alternative hypothesis of stationarity implies that σ is
less then zero. If the hypothesis is not rejected, the test is repeated using the first-differences of
each price series. In this case, the null hypothesis is nonstationary in first-differences.
The cointegration approach may be represented as follows. Consider two data series of
economic variables, xt and yt. Each series is by itself nonstationary and is required to be
differenced once to produce a stationary series. In general, a linear combination of nonstationary
data series will be nonstationary. In this case there is no long-run relationship between the data
series. However, when the data series form a long-run relationship, the data series will move
together over time, and a linear combination of the data series,
y xt t t− =ψ ε , (3)
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will produce a residual series εt which is stationary. In this case, the series xt and yt are said to be
cointegrated, with the vector [1,ψ] as the cointegration vector [27]. This is straightforward to
extend to a multivariate case. The relationship between Stigler’s [17] market definition and
cointegration is evident. In Stigler’s definition, a stable long-run relationship between prices
implies that goods are in the same market. For nonstationary price series, cointegration is the only
circumstance when the prices form a stable long-run relationship.
Two different tests for cointegration are commonly used in the literature. They are the
Engle and Granger test [27] and the Johansen test [8], [9]. We will here use the latter, since
hypothesis testing on the parameters in the cointegration vector is possible only in this framework.
The Johansen test is based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) system. A vector, xt,
containing the N variables to be tested for cointegration are assumed to be generated by an
unrestricted kth order vector autoregression in the levels of the variables;
             tktktt e++Π++Π= −− µxxx ...11 , (4)
where each of the Πi is a (N×N) matrix of parameters, µ a constant term and εt∼iid(0,Ω). The
VAR system of equations in (4) written in error correction form (ECM) is;
             ∆ Γ ∆ Πx x xt i
i
k
t i K t k te= + + +
=
−
− −

1
1
µ (5)
with  1,...,1 ,...1 −=Π++Π+−=Γ kiI ii  and 1,...,1 ,...1 −=Π++Π+−=Γ kiI ii . Hence, ΠK is
the long-run 'level solution' to (4).  If  xt is a vector of I(1) variables, the left-hand side and the
first (k-1) elements of (5) are I(0), and the last element of (5) is a linear combination of I(1)
variables. Given the assumption on the error term, this last element must also be I(0);
ktK x −Π ∼I(0). Hence, either xt contains a number of cointegration vectors, or ΠK must be a matrix
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of zeros. The rank of  ΠK, r, determines how many linear combinations of xt are stationary. If
r=N, the variables in levels are stationary; if r=0 so that ΠK=0, none of the linear combinations are
stationary. When 0<r<N, there exist r cointegration vectorsor r stationary linear combinations
of xt. In this case one can factorize ΠK; βα ′=Π− K , where both α and β are (N×r) matrices, and
β contains the cointegration vectors (the error correcting mechanism in the system) and α the
adjustment parameters. Two asymptotically equivalent tests exist in this framework, the trace test
and the maximum eigenvalue test.
The Johansen procedure allows hypothesis testing on the coefficients α and β, using
likelihood ratio tests [30]. In our case, it is restrictions on the parameters in the cointegration
vectors β which are of most interest. More specifically, in the bivariate case there are two price
series in the xt vector. Provided that the price series are cointegrated, the rank of Π = ′αβ is equal
to 1 and α and β are 2x1 vectors. Of particular interest is the Law of One Price (LOP), which can
be tested by imposing the restriction β'=(1,-1)'. In the multivariate case when all prices have the
same stochastic trend, there must be n-1 cointegration vectors in the system and each
cointegration vector must sum to zero for the LOP to hold. It then follows from the identification
scheme of Johansen and Juselius [31] that each cointegration vector can be represented so that all
but two elements are zero. When the identifying normalization is imposed in the case with three
price series, one representation of the matrix of cointegration vectors are:










−
−=
2
1 0
1
0
1
β
ββ (6)
If both β parameters are equal to 1, the LOP holds.
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Recently, a number of studies have used cointegration analysis to investigating relationships
between prices. Examples related to energy markets are Doane and Spulber [4], Sauer [32], Walls
[5], Gjølberg and Johnsen [32], DeVany and Walls [6], Serletis and Herbert [7] and Asche,
Osmundsen and Tveterås [1].
5. Empirical results
We now turn to the empirical analysis. Our data set contain monthly French import prices on
natural gas from the Netherlands, Norway and Russia for the period January 1990 to July 1997,
and the Dutch export price to Germany for the same period, using data compiled by the World
Gas Intelligence Weekly (WGI). These French import prices are shown in Figure 1 below. The
data are collected from sources close to the buyers and sellers of natural gas, and are supposed to
provide a good estimate of the contract prices. It is, of course, difficult to validate the reliability of
the estimates. However, the fact that WGI prices are used by major buyers and sellers in their
market analyses, should give an indication that the estimates are reasonably accurate.
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Figure 1. Import prices to France
Before a statistical analysis of the relationships can be carried out, we must investigate the
time series properties of the data. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were carried out for the price
series. The results are reported in Table 1 below.
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Table 1. Dickey Fuller tests
Variable Price levels First differences
with constant with trend with constant with trend
Into France from...
Russia
Netherlands
Norway
From Netherlands to...
Germany
Belgium
-2.537
-2.472
-1.921
-2.745
-1.543
-2.543
-2.705
-1.860
-2.263
-2.434
-4.538*
-4.857*
-5.633*
-4.464*
-5.397*
-4.530*
-4.859*
-7.421*
-4.362*
-7.908*
* Indicates significant at a 1% level and ** indicates significant at a 5% level. Critical values are at a 5% level with
constant -2.893 and with trend -3.451.
All prices are found to be nonstationary, but stationary in first differences The results are
stable with respect to the choice of lag length. Hence, cointegration analysis is the appropriate tool
when investigating the relationships between the prices.
The first test we perform is a multivariate Johansen test on the three French import prices.
Six lags seems to be sufficient to model the short-run dynamics, as LM-tests for autocorrelation
up to the 12th order gives the following test statistics with p-values in the parenthesis: In the
equation for Russian gas; 1.222 (0.293), for Dutch gas; 2.076 (0.034) and for Norwegian gas;
1.043 (0.424). The results from the cointegration test are reported in Table 2 below.
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Table 2. Multivariate Johansen Test of French Import Prices
H0:rank = p Max test Critical value 5% Trace test Critical value 5%
p == 0
p <= 1
p <= 2
42.35*
19.48**
4.74
22.0
15.7
9.2
66.58*
24.23**
4.74
34.9
20.0
9.2
* Indicates significant at a 1% level and ** indicates significant at a 5% level.
 Both the max and the trace test indicate that there are two cointegration vectors, and
hence one common stochastic trend. When we test for LOP, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that this holds. The test is distributed as χ2(2) and the test statistic is 5.108 with a p-value of
0.077. We also test the hypothesis that there are no systematic differences in the price levels. The
test is distributed as χ2(2) and the test statistic is 5.606 with a p-value of 0.060. Hence, also this
hypothesis is supported by the data, although with a p-value as low as 0.060, the support is not
very strong. These results indicate that the gas from the three suppliers compete closely in the
same market, as the prices move proportionally over time. Moreover, in contrast to the results of
Asche, Osmundsen and Tveterås [1] for the German market, there does not seem to be any
systematic differences in the price levels. Finally, the degree of market integration is so high that
the generalized composite commodity theorem of Lewbel [11] holds. Hence, gas from the three
suppliers can be aggregated into a single commodity with a single price.
In a system with n variables and n-1 cointegration vectors, one can always normalize the
system so that one has n-1 pairwise relationships [31]. Hence, bivariate tests can in this case in
principle provide the same information as a multivariate test. However, bivariate tests also allow
us to focus on each relationship separately. We will here utilize this to further investigate the
different relationships between the three prices. This approach is also of interest since bivariate
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relationships was the focus in most studies before cointegration analysis was introduced, and also in most studies
using the Engle and Granger test for cointegration. However, a problem is that there are more potential pairs than
uniquely identified cointegration vectors [10]. In our case we have three potentially pairs, of which only two are
linearly independent. However, since the theory gives us no guidance about which price to normalize upon, we
estimate all three potential pairs even though one of them is redundant.
The results are provided in the first section of Table 3.
Table 3. Bivariate Johansen tests for cointegration and LOP
Variables H0:rank = p Max test Trace test LOPa Constant term with
LOP imposed
No price
differenceb
Into France
Russia and
Netherlands
Russia and
Norway
Netherlands and
Norway
From Netherlands
France and
Germany
Belgium and
France
p == 0
p <= 1
p == 0
p <= 1
p == 0
p <= 1
p == 0
p <= 1
p == 0
p <= 1
25.14*
7.89
20.57*
6.42
35.44*
4.39
26.50*
6.45
28.39*
0.80
34.35*
7.89
26.99*
6.42
39.84*
4.39
32.95*
6.45
29.19*
0.80
0.453
(0.501)
6.305
(0.012)**
3.269
(0.071)
5.229**
(0.022)
3.040
(0.081)
0.017
0.015
0.001
0.014
-0.005
0.829 (0.362)
5.041 (0.025)**
3.346 (0.067)
5.828**
(0.016)
3.514
(0.061)
*indicates significant at a 1% level and ** indicates significant at a 5% level. Critical values at a 5% level is 15.7 and 9.2, respectively,
for the Max test and 20.0 and 9.2 for the Trace test.
All numbers in parenthesis are p-values.
aThe test for the Law of One Price is distributed as χ2 with 1 degrees of freedom
bThe test for price equality is distributed as χ2 with 1 degrees of freedom
cAR(12) is a LM-test against autocorrelation up to the 12th order and is distributed as F(12,59)
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Given that we found two cointegration vectors in the multivariate test for import prices
into France, it is as expected that each of the bivariate tests indicates one cointegration vector.
Furthermore, the LOP holds in all relationships, although there is some evidence against this
hypothesis in the relationship between Russian and Norwegian gas, as the p-value is 0.012. Note
also that there seems to be some evidence against the hypothesis that Russian and Norwegian
prices have the same level, as the test here has a p-value of 0.025.
We then proceed to analyze the degree of market integration between selected European
countries. The results in this paper indicate that there is one market for natural gas in France.
Given the results of Asche, Osmundsen and Tveterås [1], we also know that there is one market
for natural gas in Germany. It is therefore of interest to test whether these markets are linked.
Given that all prices in each of the markets follow the same stochastic trend, this hypothesis can be
tested by testing the relationship between any two prices from the two markets. We will here test
the relationship between the Dutch import price to both France and Germany, and also test
whether the Belgian market is related to the French market by testing the relationship between the
Dutch import price to Belgium and France. The results are reported in the last section of Table 3.
As one can see, the prices in both relationships are cointegrated. Moreover, the Law of One price
also seem to hold, although there is some evidence against it in the relationship between the prices
in France and Germany, as the p-value is as low as 0.022. Hence, the markets seems to be fairly
well integrated, although it is not entirely clear whether the French and German markets are fully
integrated, or whether there is a small wedge making the two markets close but imperfect
substitutes for Dutch sellers. There is also some evidence, although not very strong, that prices in
Germany are systematically lower than in France.
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6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined border prices of natural gas delivered to France from Russia,
Norway and the Netherlands in the period 1990-1998. Market integration tests show that the
different beach prices for gas to France move proportionally over time, indicating an integrated
gas market. In other words, the Law of One Price holds. Unlike our previous study of Germany,
we find small differences in mean prices between the three suppliers. This is surprising, since the
gas sold actually is a composite commodity containing the gas itself, swing services and other
components. Dutch gas producers are known to have the best technical opportunities to supply
swing service. Norway can supply a fair swing component, whereas the Russians can only deliver
with a limited amount of swing. Despite this, our results suggest that the Netherlands and Norway
have not obtained a price premium for their gas supplies relative to Russia.
We have also investigated the link between the French market and the German and Belgian
markets. The market integration tests indicates that there is a close relationship between these
markets as the prices follow a similar pattern over time, and is very much at the same level. Hence,
despite the few sellers and importers of natural gas in these markets, the prices behaves as if the
markets are well integrated.
Assessing the take-or pay contracts, it is evident that they represent a compromise between
the seller's and the buyer’s objectives with respect to volume guarantees and flexibility. As for
price risk, the fixed term in the contracts implies stability for the seller, whereas the escalation
terms in the price formula - linking gas prices to the price of substitutes – imply that the seller is
carrying a price risk. The French gas import prices have in the period displayed a considerable
volatility, indicating that the actual price formulas in the contracts contain high impact factors.
According to contract and incentive theory, optimal contract design implies sharing the risk among
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the contracting parties according to their ability to carry risk (i.e., according to their risk aversion),
see general analyses by Laffont [34] and Salanié [35], and applications in the petroleum industry
by Osmundsen [36]. Thus, the risk sharing in the gas supply contracts is in accordance with
theoretical recommendations only to the extent that the buyer’s commercial activity is highly
sensitive to inter-fuel competition.
What is most surprising with our results is that the high degree of correlation between
prices from different suppliers and in different markets implies that the contracts all are very
similar. Hence, it seems like the different structure in the energy sector in France from that in
Germany does not lead to contracts which reflects that the importers are exposed to different
risks.
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